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Cost-benefit analysis is a widely used approach for guiding public 
sector policy decisions.  Given the impetus provided by strong evidence of 
global warming, numerous scholars are now considering the role that cost-
benefit analysis should play, if any, in assessing climate regulation policies, 
and are offering recommendations as to how this methodology can be 
better utilized in that context.  However, that scholarship invariably 
overlooks the fact that conventional cost-benefit analyses implicitly 
embrace the untenable assumption that the genetic identities of future 
persons are exogenous with regard to the policies being evaluated.  The 
conclusions of such cost-benefit analyses are therefore irrelevant to the real 
choices at hand, since genetic identity is in fact endogenous relative to the 
policies that we pursue.  In other words, our current policies will not only 
have long-term impacts upon the wealth of future persons, they will also 
determine who those persons are, and that important consequence should 
not be overlooked.    
The various recommendations that these scholars offer with regard to 
improving cost-benefit valuation techniques for measuring the social cost of 
carbon emissions, or with regard to properly discounting future policy 
effects, are somewhat beside the point given the fundamentally inapt 
valuation comparisons that most cost-benefit analysts are making.  This 
scholarship would perhaps be better directed at first of all developing some 
suitable means for incorporating the endogeniety of identity into cost-
benefit analysis. 
In this short article I draw upon the work of Derek Parfit to 
demonstrate the devastating implications that recognition of the 
endogeniety of identity has for the relevance of conventional cost-benefit 
analysis for climate regulation policy.  I also discuss and criticize for their 
failure to address this problem several recent efforts by leading scholars to 
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critique and improve the application of cost-benefit analysis to climate 
regulation policy.   
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I. Introduction
The evidence is rather convincing that rapid and significant global 
warming is taking place, and as a result climate regulation policy has 
become a focus of scholarly attention.
1
  One important academic discussion 
relates to the proper role that cost-benefit analysis should play, if any, in 
guiding the development of climate regulation measures.
2
  Among those 
scholars who have decided that the cost-benefit methodology is a suitable 
approach for comparing the relative merits of alternative climate regulation 
policies there are also discussions regarding how the different valuations 
that this methodology calls for can be most accurately calculated and 
rendered comparable with one another.
3
    
Unfortunately, however, the efforts being made to assess and improve 
the application of cost-benefit analysis to the difficult questions posed by 
climate regulation consistently avoid the central conceptual difficulty 
presented by the use of that methodology in this context where policy 
1. See FRANK ACKERMAN & ELIZABETH STANTON, THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 1
(2010) (discussing the average expected damages of climate change); Jonathan Masur & 
Eric Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis 2 (U. Chi. Pub. Law 
Working Paper No. 315, 2010) (examining the record of the federal agencies and the 
Interagency Working Group for agreement on climate change). 
2. See Richard Revesz & Matthew Shahabian, Climate Change and Future
Generations 79–82 (NYU Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 10–38, 2010) [hereinafter 
Revesz & Shahabian] (addressing the more general question of how to properly discount the 
future policy impacts of various regulatory alternatives to present values for comparison 
with their current costs). 
3. See id. at 10–59 (addressing the general question of how to discount the future
policy impacts of regulatory alternatives in comparison with current costs). 
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choices will have important long-term consequences.
4
  Virtually none of 
this recent work addresses a fundamental problem that renders essentially 
irrelevant the conclusions of cost-benefit analysis whenever the analysts 
start from conventional baseline assumptions when attempting to assess the 
long-term consequences of a policy for future persons who have not yet 
been conceived when the policy is first implemented, as opposed to either 
starting with more realistic and complex baseline assumptions, or else 
sharply limiting the scope of the analysis to only assessing the 
consequences of the policy for those persons already in existence when that 
policy is implemented.
5
  Cost-benefit analysis starting from conventional 
baseline assumptions is particularly poorly suited as an approach for 
assessing climate regulation policies, since a crucial aspect of those policies 
is their impact upon the welfare of future persons not yet conceived when 
the policies are first implemented.
6
     
 The problem here is that cost-benefit analysts consistently overlook 
the crucial fact that the fundamental genetic identities of the members of 
future generations are endogenous rather than exogenous with regard to the 
policies being evaluated.
7
  Put another way, when a policy is implemented 
it will not only impact the wealth of the members of future generations, but 
                                                 
 4.  See Gregory S. Crespi, A Brief Reflection on the Problem of Person-Altering 
Consequences, 2 J. APP. ECON. 13, 13–22 (2009) [hereinafter Crespi, A Brief Reflection] 
(discussing the existence of trade-offs and difficult ethical questions that are far too often 
overlooked by policy makers); Gregory S. Crespi, The Fatal Flaw of Cost-Benefit Analysis:  
The Problem of Person-Altering Consequences, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 
10703, 10705 (2008) [hereinafter Crespi, The Fatal Flaw] (criticizing the conventional cost-
benefit analyses that consistently ignore the pervasive and dramatic person-altering 
consequences of policies); Gregory S. Crespi, What’s Wrong with Dumping Radioactive 
Wastes in the Ocean?  The Surprising Ethical and Policy Analysis Implications of Person-
Altering Consequences, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10873, 10873 (2007) 
[hereinafter Crespi, What’s Wrong] (discussing how policy decisions have person-altering 
consequences and so we have no ethical obligations to future generations who have had their 
genetic identities significantly altered by those person-altering consequences, since any 
policy that we might pursue would be a necessary condition of future generation‘s 
existence). 
 5.  See Crespi, A Brief Reflection, supra note 4, at 13–22 (discussing the existence 
trade-offs and the difficult ethical question that is far too often overlooked by policy 
makers); Crespi, The Fatal Flaw, supra note 4 at 10706–09 (criticizing the conventional 
cost-benefit analyses that consistently ignore the pervasive and dramatic person-altering 
consequences of policies); Crespi, What’s Wrong, supra note 4, at 10873 (discussing how 
policy decisions have person-altering consequences and so we have no ethical obligations to 
future generations who have had their genetic identities significantly altered by those person-
altering consequences, since any policy that we might pursue would be a necessary condition 
of future generation‘s existence).  
 6.  See Crespi, The Fatal Flaw, supra note 4, at 10705 (criticizing the conventional 
cost-benefit analyses). 
 7.  Crespi, A Brief Reflection, supra note 4, at 14 (2009); Crespi, What’s Wrong, 
supra note 4, at 10880.  See Crespi, The Fatal Flaw, supra note 4, at 10708–09 (2008) 
(criticizing the conventional cost-benefit analyses). 
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will also, after a relatively short transitional period, even determine who 
those persons are, i.e., determine the genetic identities of all future persons.
8
  
The conventional working assumption almost always utilized when 
conducting cost-benefit analyses, generally implicitly rather than explicitly 
stated and defended, is that the same future persons with the same genetic 
endowments will come into existence whether or not a policy is 
implemented.
9
  Under this simplifying assumption the impacts of a policy 
upon the welfare of those future persons can be measured by comparing the 
circumstances that they will face if the policy is implemented with the 
baseline scenario of the circumstances that they will instead face if the 
policy is not implemented, and then valuing these differences as benefits (or 
costs) in accordance with those future persons‘ estimated willingness to pay 
to enjoy (or to avoid) those policy impacts.
10
   
 Embrace of the simplifying assumption that genetic identity is 
exogenous—that the genetic identities of future persons will be unaffected 
by the policies pursued, which will only affect their wealth—certainly has 
the advantage that it greatly facilitates assigning valuations to policy 
consequences, but it is unfortunately an untenable assumption.
11
  This 
assumption is demonstrably false and moreover drastically changes the 
valuations that are assigned to future policy consequences from what they 
would have been had they been assessed with regard to a more realistic 
baseline scenario.
12
  The results of a cost-benefit analysis that is done in 
accordance with this simplifying assumption are therefore essentially 
irrelevant to the real choices at hand.
13
  Unfortunately for cost-benefit 
analysis, however, the other horn of this dilemma is that if one incorporates 
the far more realistic recognition of the endogeniety of genetic identity this 
leads to valuations of policy impacts that are so massively large and so 
speculative and imprecise as to make any comparisons across policies 
essentially meaningless.
14
  The results of the analyses then will not provide 
helpful guidance to policy makers, regardless of how rigorously and 
carefully the valuation calculations are carried out, and regardless of what 
                                                 
 8.  Crespi, A Brief Reflection, supra note 4, at 15–16; Crespi, The Fatal Flaw, supra 
note 4, at 10708–09; Crespi, What’s Wrong, supra note 4, at 10880. 
 9.  Crespi, A Brief Reflection, supra note 4, at 15–16; Crespi, The Fatal Flaw, supra 
note 4, at 10710; Crespi, What’s Wrong, supra note 4, at 10878.  
 10.   Crespi, A Brief Reflection, supra note 4, at 15–16; Crespi, The Fatal Flaw, supra 
note 4, at 10710; Crespi, What’s Wrong, supra note 4, at 10879. 
 11.  See Gregory S. Crespi, How Recognizing the Endogeniety of Identity Renders the 
Discounting Debate Largely Irrelevant, 30 J.  LAND, RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 75, 75 (2010) 
(discussing how the typical cost benefit analyses overlook the important endogenous person 
altering consequences).  
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 120. 
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discount rates are then utilized to convert future policy impacts to present 
value figures.
15
      
 The problem posed by the endogeniety of identity is quite daunting, 
and perhaps even fatal, for the usefulness of the cost-benefit methodology.
16
  
I have written extensively about the significance of the endogeniety of 
identity problem for cost-benefit analysis and, more generally, for any 
purely consequentialist evaluative framework that attempts to assess 
policies solely by considering their consequences for the persons they will 
affect.
17
  In Part II of this article I will first describe this endogeniety of 
identity problem in greater detail, and then discuss how it renders the cost-
benefit methodology particularly unsuitable for the evaluation of climate 
regulation policies.
18
   
 To illustrate my point about the conceptual deficiencies of recent 
scholarly efforts to improve the application of cost-benefit analysis to 
climate regulation policy, efforts that do not take into account the 
endogeniety of identity, I will in Part III of this article briefly discuss a few 
recent and representative examples of climate regulation/cost-benefit 
analysis scholarship that have been carried out by some of the leading 
researchers in the area, and that all exhibit this same shortcoming.  I will 
first consider two recent SSRN working papers.  One of these papers is by 
Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner of the University of Chicago, and 
addresses the question of determining the social cost of carbon emissions,
19
  
The other paper is by Richard Revesz and Matthew Shahabian of the 
N.Y.U. Law School, and addresses the more general question of how to 
properly discount the future policy impacts of various regulatory 
                                                 
 15.  Id. at 121. 
 16.  See Gregory S. Crespi, The Endogeniety Problem in Cost-Benefit Analysis:  
Valuing Policies that Alter Preferences or Genetic Identities, 8 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y. 91, 
118 (2010) (explaining the problem of endogeniety of identity). 
 17.  See Crespi, A Brief Reflection, supra note 4, at 14 (discussing how person-altering 
consequences render the conventional cost-benefit framework useless); Crespi, The Fatal 
Flaw, supra note 4, at 10703–16 (analyzing the controversy over cost-benefit analysis‘s 
ability to access programs and policies); Crespi supra note 11, at 75 (demonstrating that 
there is much less at stake than generally realized in the debates regarding how to 
commensurate the adverse impacts upon existing persons with beneficial impacts upon the 
members of future generations); Gregory S. Crespi, Incorporating Endogenous Preferences 
in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 17 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 157, 179–88 (2009) (elaborating upon 
an internal critique of the cost-benefit methodology that has significant implications for the 
assessment of policy consequences by the willingness to pay yardstick); id. at 118–32 
(discussing how the endogeniety of identity is a more serious problem than the endogeniety 
of preferences); Crespi, What’s Wrong, supra note 4, at 10884 (acknowledging past 
contributions on the problem of person altering consequences). 
 18.  See sources cited infra note 26 (discussing the endogeneity of identity problem and 
the different cost analyses and the impact on the environment). 
 19.  See Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 3–4 (illustrating the social costs of carbon 
emissions). 
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alternatives to present values for comparison with their current costs.
20
  I 
will then discuss a recent report by Frank Ackerman and Elizabeth Stanton 
of the Stockholm Environment Institute that was done for the Economics 
for Equity and the Environment Network, and which also addresses the 
social cost of carbon emissions and the question of determining appropriate 
discount rates.
21
  Part IV will present a brief overall conclusion. 
 
II.  The Endogeneity of Identity 
 
 The noted British philosopher Derek Parfit first articulated in 1976
22
 a 
simple yet profound insight that philosophers have since labeled the "non-
identity problem,"
23
 and which I will refer to in this article as the 
                                                 
 20.  See Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 2, at 79–82 (expounding on the different 
discounting methods and comparing them).   
 21.  See ACKERMAN & STANTON, supra note 1, at 11–17 (discussing the social cost of 
carbon and different discount rates and proposing a method of calculation).  
 22.  See Derek Parfit, On Doing the Best for Our Children, in ETHICS AND POPULATION 
100–15 (M. Bayles, ed. 1976) [hereinafter Parfit, On Doing the Best] (discussing the 
problems with Narveson‘s person-affecting principle and the differences between policies 
and how they affect us in the short term and long term); see also DEREK PARFIT, REASONS 
AND PERSONS 351–80 (1984) [hereinafter PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS] (developing his 
insights); Gregory S. Kavka, The Paradox of Future Individuals, 11 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 93, 93–
112 (1982) (arguing that Parfit‘s insight was also discovered independently at approximately 
the same time by Robert Adams and by Thomas Schwartz and citing Robert M. Adams, 
Existence, Self-Interest, and the Problem of Evil, 13 NOÛS 53, 57 (1979) (discussing God‘s 
decisions in creating and evaluating actions that shape the future), and also citing Thomas 
Schwartz, Obligations to Posterity, in OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 3–13 (Richard 
Sikora & Brian Barry eds., 1978) (arguing that there‘s no obligation to distant descendants to 
limit population growth); Derek Parfit, Comments, 96 ETHICS 832, 854 (1986) [hereinafter 
Parfit, Comments] (discussing the Non-Identity Problem); Derek Parfit, Future Generations, 
Further Problems, 11 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 113, 115–17 (1982) [hereinafter Parfit, Future 
Generations] (expanding on his insights). 
 23.  See, e.g., PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS, supra note 22, at 378 (labeling the 
problem as the Non-Identity Problem and it is generally so described by other academic 
philosophers); Anthony D‘Amato, What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? 
An Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility:  Do We Owe a Duty to Future 
Generations to Preserve the Global Environment?, 84 A.J.I.L. 190, 191 (1990) (regarding 
Parfit‘s paradox, it may be preferable to pose the problem as a non-paradoxical though 
difficult question of determining the ethical and policy valuation implications of policies that 
have among their other long-term effects pervasive endogeniety of identity consequences); 
Kavka, supra note 22, at 95 (describing the problem as the Parfit Paradox); Doran Smolkin, 
Towards a Rights-Based Solution to the Non-Identity Problem, 30 J. SOC. PHIL. 194, 194 
(1999) (illustrating through examples the non-identity problem); David Wasserman, The 
Nonidentity Problem, Disability, and the Role Morality of Prospective Parents, 116 ETHICS 
132, 132–33 (2005) (following Hanser and discussing the duties of prospective parents).  See 
Lothar Gundling, What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next?  An Approach to 
Global Environmental Responsibility:  Our Responsibility to Future Generations, 84 A.J.I.L. 
207, 210 (1990) (referring to this insight as "Parfit‘s paradox"); Edith Brown Weiss, What 
Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next?  An Approach to Global Environmental 
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recognition of the endogeneity of identity.
24
  Once one recognizes that 
identity is endogenous, the inadequacy of any analysis of policy impacts 
that overlooks this fact is quite clear, although as I will discuss below it is 
difficult if not impossible to conduct analyses that do meaningfully 
incorporate the endogeniety of identity.  While the endogeniety of identity 
has fostered substantial (though inconclusive) discussion among 
philosophers and other scholars over the last three decades at an abstract, 
academic level regarding its ethical significance,
25
 its dramatic practical 
implications for policymakers in general and cost-benefit analysts in 
particular have not yet been adequately appreciated.
26
  
                                                                                                                 
Responsibility:  Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment, 84 
A.J.I.L. 198, 204 (1990) (referring to this insight as "Derek Parfit‘s famous paradox").  
 24.  In my opinion, Parfit‘s Non-Identity Problem label obscures somewhat the precise 
nature of the problem for those who are not academic philosophers and are not familiar with 
the problem and the body of scholarship that it has engendered.  I therefore will use in this 
article the more straightforward descriptive phrase endogeneity of identity. 
 25.  See, e.g., Adams, supra note 22, at 57 (discussing God‘s decisions in creation and 
evaluating actions that shape the future); Ori J. Herstein, Historic Injustice and the Non-
Identity Problem:  The Limitations of the Subsequent-Wrong Solution and Towards a New 
Solution, 27 LAW & PHIL. 505, 505–31 (2008) (detailing the problems more recently); 
Kavka, supra note 22, at 93–95 (discussing why we are under no moral obligation to future 
people to pursue controlled growth policies in order to promote their well-being); Schwartz, 
supra note 22, at 3–4 (arguing that there‘s no obligation to distant descendants to limit 
population growth); Smolkin, supra note 23, at 194 (illustrating through examples the non-
identity problem). See Joanna Pasek, Environmental Policy and ‘The Identity Problem’ 1–2 
(CSERGE Working Paper GEC 93-13, 2008) (arguing that the identity problem follows 
logically from assumptions concerning the concepts of harm and personal identity.); James 
Woodward, The Non-Identity Problem, 96 ETHICS 804, 804–31 (1986) (discussing Derek 
Parfit‘s treatment of the Non-Identity Problem in part 4 of REASONS AND PERSONS).  
 26. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem and 
Legal Liability, 60 HAST. L. J. 347, 348 (2008) (discussing the problems with Smolensky‘s 
arguments in her article); Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 YALE HUM. 
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 7 (2007) (seeking to define the procreative right); Michael Laudor, In 
Defense of Wrongful Life:  Bringing Political Theory to the Defense of a Tort, 62 FORD. L. 
REV. 1675, 1676 (1994) (focusing on problems of future interests, the problems inherent in 
one standard conception of harm, Parfit‘s solution and his recognition of the shortcomings of 
the conception of harm, the failures of some attempts to reformulate utilitarianism, and the 
roots of the problems of future people‘s interests); Lukas H. Meyer, The Palestinian 
Refugees and the Right of Return:  Theoretical Perspectives:  Historical Injustice and the 
Right of Return, 5 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 305, 307–11 (2004) (considering the significance of 
the endogeniety of identity for  the validity of the claims made by the descendants of 
displaced Palestinian refugees for a right to return to their ancestral homeland); Phillip G. 
Peters, Harming Future Persons:  Obligations to the Children of Reproductive Technology, 
8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 376 (1999) (exploring an alternative way of determining 
whether an existence inducing act is harmful to children); Eric Rakowski, Who Should Pay 
for Bad Genes?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1345, 1390 (2002) (discussing the practical implications on 
policy-makers as well as the effect on insurance arrangements as a result of choosing genes); 
John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 
AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 8 (2004) (arguing that even if children are not harmed, other effects or 
implications of the situation may be relevant in making professional and policy decisions 
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 In this short article I will not attempt to fully articulate or resolve the 
complex philosophical arguments that have been offered regarding the 
implications of the endogeniety of identity, although I will reference much 
of that literature for those philosophically-oriented readers who wish to 
later explore this problem in a more comprehensive fashion.
27
  I will instead 
discuss the problem in a more condensed and straightforward manner that is 
intended to be helpful to lawyers, public policy analysts, and academics in 
other fields who are not deeply versed in these technical philosophical 
debates, but who nevertheless wish to better understand the endogeniety of 
identity and its devastating implications for the wisdom of using of cost-
benefit analyses for guidance in climate regulation policy.  
 Parfit has clearly been the primary instigator of and contributor to 
discussions of the difficulties involved dealing with the endogeniety of 
identity through several works that he published over the 1976–1986 
                                                                                                                 
about them); Amy J. Sepinwall, Responsibility for Historical Injustices:  Reconceiving the 
Case for Reparations, 22 J. L. & POLITICS 183, 190–91 (2006) (considering the significance 
of endogeniety of identity consequences for the validity of the claims made by the 
descendants of slaves for reparations payments); Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating 
Children with Disabilities:  Parental Tort Liability for Preimplantation Genetic 
Interventions, 60 HAST. L. J. 299, 300–01 (2008) (examining both intentional tort claims and 
ordinary negligence claims in the context of preimplantation genetic choices and concluding 
that intentional tort claims from PSD should not be allowed because Parfit's Non-Identity 
Problem prohibits the finding of a legally cognizable injury).  See DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-
PRAGMATISM:  MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 151 
n.38 (1999); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Justice Unconceived:  How Posterity Has Rights, 14 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 393, 397 (2002) ("[T]he topic of future generations‘ rights has 
spawned a growing literature—or, rather, at least two separate literatures, one in law and the 
other in philosophy, with very little interaction between the two."); Daniel Farber and Jeffrey 
Gaba, From Here to Eternity:  Environmental Law and Future Generations, 2003 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 289, 302 n.69 (2003) (citing quotes made by Derek Parfit on this topic and addressing 
the problem of endogeniety of identity at least tangentially); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Environmental 
Ethics and Our Moral Relationship to Future Generations:  Future Rights and Present 
Virtue, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 249, 258 n.24 (1999) (referring to Anthony D‘Amato, Do We 
Owe a Duty to Future Generations to Preserve the Global Environment, 84 AM. J. INT‘L L. 
190 (1990) (restating argument first put forth by Derek Parfit in Parfit, On Doing the Best 
for Our Children, in ETHICS &POPULATION 100 (M. Bayles ed. 1976))); sources cited supra 
note 17 (citing several articles where I have attempted to contribute to such a fuller 
assessment, addressing some of the implications of the problem of the endogeniety of 
identity, but that literature fails to fully incorporate the insights of the philosophers who have 
addressed the matter).  See also, Douglas Kysar, It Might Have Been:  Risk, Precaution, and 
Opportunity Costs, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2006) (recognizing that this 
problem does pose "deep conceptual challenges" to any analytical method such as cost-
benefit analysis "that is framed in terms of the rights, preferences, or interests of particular 
individuals"). 
 27. See Crespi, What’s Wrong, supra note 4, at 10873–77 (discussing a more 
comprehensive review of this literature). 




  The most significant of these efforts were his seminal 1976 
article
29
 and his more comprehensive 1984 book Reasons and Persons,
30
 
but he has also made other contributions to this debate.
31
  Parfit‘s seminal 
insight is that virtually any human action, however slight its initial impacts 
on the actor or on other persons, is likely to have at least minor indirect 
effects on the precise timing of or other circumstances surrounding some 
successful acts of sexual reproduction.
32
  Given the radically contingent 
nature of a particular sperm-egg union, these effects will lead to different 
sperm-egg fertilizations occurring than would otherwise have taken place, 
and to the subsequent birth of now genetically different persons with 
different physical endowments and temperaments from those of the persons 
that would otherwise have been born.
33
  These differences will over time 
lead to exponentially cascading consequences of a genetic identity-altering 
nature, as these genetically different individuals mature and lead their 
unique lives and influence the sexual and other behavior of a broader and 
broader circle of people, leading indirectly to the alteration of the genetic 
endowments of larger and larger numbers of later conceived persons.
34
  
                                                 
 28. PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS, supra note 22, at 351–80; Parfit, Comments, 
supra note 22, at 854; Parfit, Future Generations, supra note 22, at 115–17; Parfit, On 
Doing the Best, supra note 22, at 100–15. 
 29. See Parfit, On Doing the Best, supra note 22, at 100–02 (using the hypothetical of 
a woman deciding whether to postpone pregnancy due to an illness that would result in her 
child being born with a handicap to illustrate the endogeniety of identity consequences of 
policies on the people who will be born as a result of those policies). 
 30. See PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS, supra note 22, at 351–79 (claiming that it 
may be possible to formulate a valuation approach that appropriately addresses the problem 
of the endogeniety of identity, and which can justify moral condemnation even of policies 
that hurt no one). 
 31. See Parfit, Comments, supra note 22, at 854 (conceding that he was unable to 
formulate the needed new theory about beneficence that would justify the No Difference 
View conclusion). This 1986 article was included in an 1986 ETHICS symposium issue 
focusing on his 1984 book REASONS AND PERSONS, and which also included contributions 
by Brian Barry, Susan Wolf, Bart Schultz, Shelly Kagan, Bart Gruzalski, Arthur Kuflik and 
James Woodward.  In that article Parfit responded in detail to each of the other symposium 
contributors‘ comments on his 1984 book.  In particular, Parfit responded in some detail to 
James Woodward‘s article, James Woodward, The Non-Identity Problem, 96 ETHICS 804, 
804–31 (1986) (specifically focusing on the Non-Identity Problem); Parfit, Future 
Generations, supra note 22, at 171–72; see also Parfit, Comments, supra note 22, at 854–62 
(concluding that policies with person-altering consequences simply cannot be properly 
evaluated on the basis of whether the results of those policies are better or worse for the 
rights or interests of future persons).  
 32. See D‘Amato, supra note 23, at 190–92 (discussing Parfit‘s paradox and 
concluding that any attempted altruism on our part to intervene in the environment to help 
future persons will make those persons incomparably worse off than if we had not 
intervened). 
 33. Id. at 191. 
 34.  Id. 
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 Parfit‘s insight is rather obvious and hard to disagree with once it is 
understood, as are many of the more important intellectual achievements of 
human history, but its consequences for policy analysis are more subtle yet 
truly momentous.  Any social policy that is significant enough in its direct 
or indirect impact on human behavior to lead to even a single different 
sperm-egg fusion taking place will create a genetically different individual 
than the person that would have been born absent the implementation of the 
policy.
35
  Even the most minor and local policy will surely have that much 
impact on someone‘s behavior.36  And over time, as that now genetically 
different individual is born and matures and over their life influences 
numerous other people in major or minor ways, this will result in an 
exponentially spreading cascade of fundamental genetic changes in the 
population of individuals subsequently conceived.
37
  After a relatively short 
transitional period, in a historical sense, of probably no more than a few 
decades at the most the genetic identity of all individuals that are conceived 
and born over the rest of eternity will be fundamentally different from what 
it would have been in the absence of the policy.
38
  The policy will thus have 
changed the identity of all of those future persons; they will be different 
people in the most fundamental genetic sense.
39
  The entire human 
population for the rest of eternity will now be composed of individuals that 
have significantly different genetic endowments from the genetic 
endowments of those persons that would have come into existence absent 




 Think about this conundrum for a moment.  One rather dramatic 
impact of virtually any policy measure will thus be the elimination of all 
members of the population of distant future generations that would have 
been conceived and born absent the implementation of the policy, and their 
replacement by an entirely different group of people.  Stated more 
succinctly, the genetic identity of all future persons after a relatively short 
transitional period is endogenous to the policies pursued.  From the 
perspective of those affected, both those persons who will now be 
conceived and born as a consequence of the policy, and those "persons," if 
they can be so described, who as another consequence of the policy will 
now never come into existence, there could not be a more dramatic 
                                                 
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id.  
 40.  See id. (discussing how rapidly the endogeniety of identity consequences of a 
policy will proliferate, and how quickly the genetic divergence will be large enough to be of 
major significance to the personal identities of the persons affected, will differ from policy 
to policy). 




  These endogeniety of identity consequences will completely 
dwarf in significance for these persons the combined effect of all other 
policy consequences.
42
  These genetic identity consequences as well as the 
other consequences of a policy therefore obviously need to be taken into 
account in any comprehensive assessment of its merits, whether that 
assessment is done through the cost-benefit methodology or otherwise. 
 Parfit‘s insight is clearly correct, as a matter of scientific fact,43 and is 
an example of what is commonly referred to as the "butterfly effect" of 
chaos theory
44
 where small perturbations in initial conditions can lead to 
massive overall systemic effects.
45
  Parfit was primarily concerned in his 
philosophical work on the endogeniety of identity with assessing its ethical 
implications, which he understandably found to be quite disturbing.
46
  In 
                                                 
 41.  See id. (describing how future persons and those who will never come into 
existence are both affected by changes in the environment). 
 42.  See id. (implying that because endogeneity of identity consequences determine 
whether or not a person will exist, they are of utmost importance). 
 43. See id. at 192 (noting that Parfit‘s theory is "scientifically accurate, stemming from 
the discovery in recent years of chaos theory").  This conclusion assumes, of course, that a 
person‘s identity is determined by their genetic endowment, or by the physical and cultural 
circumstances of their lives, or both, rather than determined by some kind of ethereal 
Cartesian ego or "soul" that is wholly independent of genetic characteristics or physical or 
cultural influences.  I will assume for the purposes of this article that if the genetic 
endowment of a person is significantly altered as a consequence of a policy this can be 
regarded as a change in that person‘s fundamental identity, whereas any consequence of a 
policy that does not significantly alter a person‘s genetic endowment, no matter how 
significant that consequence otherwise is to that person‘s life, does not change the 
fundamental identity of that person.  
 44.  See id. at 190–92 ("An environmental intervention as slight as a butterfly flapping 
its wings near a weather station will change long-term weather predictions."). 
 45.  See id. at 191 (describing how "our intervention in the environment will make a 
sufficient impact to assure that different sperm cells will probably fertilize the egg cells in all 
procreations that take place subsequent to our environmental intervention"). 
 46.   Parfit himself is obviously most uncomfortable with the unavoidable implication 
of his insight that current policies that favor existing persons but that have adverse or even 
disastrous impacts upon future persons would nevertheless be regarded as beneficial by 
those future persons relative to their alternative of nonexistence if the policy is not pursued, 
and thus those policies cannot be criticized on the usual person-affecting basis that they 
would injure particular people.  See Parfit, On Doing the Best, supra note 22, at 102 ("[T]he 
long-term effects of social policies, even if clearly disastrous . . . won‘t be worse for 
particular people.  They are thus ignored. . . . a ‗person-affecting‘ principle gives to the 
further future no weight.  This seems indefensible.").  Parfit thus demonstrates that he 
understands the serious problem posed by endogeniety of identity consequences for any 
utilitarian criterion or related measure such as the Kaldor-Hicks wealth-maximization 
criterion that attempts to aggregate in some fashion the impacts of policies upon the affected 
persons.  See id. at 100 ("Such difficulties [posed by person-altering consequences] may 
seem to face only utilitarians.  This is not so.  They face most of those who give any weight 
to a utilitarian principle.").  He is unfortunately somewhat opaque in this brief 1976 essay 
regarding how this problem should be resolved.  He clearly rejects the alternative of simply 
ignoring the exponentially cascading endogeniety of identity consequences that will 
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this article, however, I will focus instead upon the implications of the 
endogeniety of identity for the conduct of cost-benefit analyses for 
evaluating possible climate regulation policies. 
 In conventional cost-benefit analyses these important consequences of 
policies for the genetic identity of future persons are invariably 
overlooked.
47
  The typical cost-benefit analyst calculates both the benefits 
and the costs of the policy at issue by the yardstick of the willingness to pay 
of the affected persons, as compared to the reference point of a hypothetical 
baseline scenario of a world in which the exact same persons will exist, but 
without experiencing the policy‘s impacts.48  This methodology is 
tantamount to an implicit assumption that personal identity is exogenous; 
that the same future population of individuals will exist whether or not a 
particular policy is implemented.
49
  But such an assumption is not merely 
implausible but is demonstrably false, and is equivalent to simply ignoring 
the fact of the endogeniety of identity.
50
  The calculation of costs and 
benefits relative to an baseline reference scenario that arbitrarily and most 
implausibly assumes that identity is exogenous renders the conclusions of 
such an analysis irrelevant to the real choices at hand among the actual 
consequences that are possible to achieve through the alternative policies 
under consideration, given the fact of endogeniety of identity.
51
  
 It might at first appear that this analytical problem is manageable and 
could be solved simply by more realistically specifying the hypothetical 
                                                                                                                 
generally occur when a policy is implemented, particularly given that the total number of 
future persons that would be born will also likely be affected as well as their individual 
identities.  Id. at 103.  He does state that the problem of endogeneiety of identity implies that 
the long-term consequences of policies should not be determined by their impacts upon the 
rights and interests of the affected future persons but he does not offer an alternative 
valuation method.  Id. at 102. 
 47. For example, a recent and otherwise rather comprehensive discussion of cost-
benefit analysis written by John Graham, who served as the Director of the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and Budget from 
2001–2006, does not even mention the problems posed for the viability of cost-benefit 
analysis by the endogeniety of identity.  See John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through 
Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 403 (2008) (proposing that 
benefit-cost analysis is an appropriate method for informing the promulgation of 
regulations).  
 48.  See id. at 412 (asserting that the original normative foundation for benefit-cost 
analysis uses "‗willingness to pay‘ money as the measure of social benefit and ‗willingness 
to accept‘ money as the measure of social cost").  
 49.  See id. at 404 (offering approach to benefit-cost analysis that does not mention the 
fact of the endogeneity of identity). 
 50.  See D‘Amato, supra note 23, at 192 (asserting that endogeneity is a scientific fact). 
 
 51.  See id. ("People encountering Parfit‘s thesis for the first time are properly skeptical 
that a minor intervention in the environment can actually result in entirely different 
individuals in 100 years . . . . But the result is scientifically accurate, stemming from the 
discovery in recent years of chaos theory."). 
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baseline scenario used as a reference point for valuing the impacts of the 
policy at issue.  This baseline scenario could, for example, be specified in a 
manner that recognizes that different future persons would exist were the 
policy to be implemented and generate its pervasive and eventually 
universal gene-altering consequences for personal identities, consequences 
that would not exist were the policy not to be implemented.  The valuations 
of policy impacts would then be calculated in a much more accurate fashion 
with reference to the actual alternative of non-existence for the persons 
impacted had the policy not been implemented.  Unfortunately, a little 
further reflection suggests that the problem is not so easily fixable.  
 Once a cost-benefit analyst eats of the apple of the tree of knowledge, 
i.e., recognizes that all policies have pervasive and eventually universal 
consequences for the genetic identities of future individuals, she is put into 
in a real bind with no good choices available within the standard 
methodological framework.
52
  Continuing to ignore those consequences, 
given their overwhelming significance to the persons affected relative to all 
other policy impacts, would be to disregard the comprehensive willingness 
to pay valuation principle that underlies the cost-benefit approach, and is 
not an option if one wants to reach results that are relevant to the actual 
choices at hand.
53
  However, if one attempts to incorporate endogeniety of 
identity consequences into the analysis one runs into the obstacle that there 
does not appear to be any way to meaningfully estimate in a willingness to 
pay-based manner the size of the massive benefits to future generations that 
would result under each of the various policy options under consideration, 
so as to provide useful guidance for choosing among them.
54
  
 Let me explain more fully the seemingly insurmountable measurement 
problem that presents itself.
55
  It is immediately apparent that to evaluate 
the merits of a policy that will have genetic identity-altering consequences 
for future persons—which a little reflection reveals includes any policy 
whatsoever given the inevitability of exponentially spreading genetic 
consequences from even initially very minor effects—the endogeniety of 
identity will have to be explicitly incorporated in some manner.
56
  The 
                                                 
 52.  See Crespi, Fatal Flaw, supra note 4, at 10705 ("The basic analytical conundrum 
presented is that if one attempts to so incorporate these person-altering consequences into a 
cost-benefit analysis, rather than simply ignoring them, the valuation calculations become so 
unwieldy and imprecise as to essentially be indeterminate."). 
 53.  See id. ("In light of the seemingly insurmountable problems that the willingness-
to-pay-based valuation framework faces in meaningfully assessing the significance of 
person-altering consequences, it may simply be the case that cost benefit analysis should no 
longer be regarded as a useful analytical tool."). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  See id. at 10709 (justifying incorporation of person-altering consequences into an 
analysis because "it will not be adequate merely to apply a time discount to the policy‘s 
future impacts, as is now done"). 
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justifications generally offered for discounting future impacts at an 
appropriate discount rate are not necessarily affected by inclusion of these 
consequences, but it is now also necessary to sharply differentiate between 
the policy‘s future impacts upon existing persons57 over the rest of their 
post-policy implementation lives, which do not include alteration of their 
genetic identities, and the policy‘s impacts upon future persons,58 which 




 There are two distinct groups of future "persons" that will be affected 
in fundamentally different ways by the consequences of a policy.  There is, 
first of all, the very large group of future persons who will actually be 
conceived and born over the subsequent course of history as a result of 
those consequences.  For them, the implementation of the policy is a 
necessary condition of their existence.  Second, there is the vastly larger 
group of what I will here refer to as "potential but now never to be 
conceived future persons" who would have been conceived and born as a 
consequence of our pursuing one or another of the potentially unlimited 
number of alternative courses of action other than the policy at issue, 
including the null option of taking no action, but who will not be conceived 
if the policy at issue is implemented.
60
  
 It is rather obvious that the hypothetical preferences of this second 
group of untold trillions of potential but now never to be conceived future 
persons should not be given any weight in a cost-benefit analysis of the 
policy at issue.  With their very existence at stake, each of these future 
persons would likely regard any specific policy—other than the single 
policy that would result in their coming into existence—as imposing 
                                                 
 57.  By the term "existing persons" I mean to refer broadly to not only those persons 
who are already born at the time of the policy in question‘s implementation, but also those 
persons already conceived but not yet born at that time, as well as those members of the 
"transitional generations" following the policy who were conceived after the implementation 
of the policy and whose genetic identity has not yet been significantly altered by the 
spreading endogeniety of identity consequences of the policy. 
 58.  By the term "future persons" I mean to refer broadly to those persons conceived 
after the implementation of the policy in question whose genetic identity has been 
significantly altered by the spreading endogeniety of identity consequences of the policy.  
For any policy there will be a transitional period of some length during which some but not 
all persons born will have had their genetic identities fundamentally altered by the 
consequences of the policy, before those consequences become universal in scope.  See also 
supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining the term "existing persons").  
 59.  This paragraph and much of the following text builds upon George S. Crespi, The 
Endogeneity Problem in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 91–145 (2010). 
 60.  It is perhaps a misnomer to refer to these wholly imaginary "beings" that never 
will come into existence as being "persons" in any sense whatsoever, but for lack of a better 
descriptive phrase I will refer to them as such. 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS & CLIMATE POLICY EVALUATION 241 
 
immense costs upon them,
61
 resulting in a very large if not infinite 
aggregate cost measure for any specific policy whatsoever that even if 
heavily time-discounted would dominate any measure of benefits that is 
utilized.  This absurd result of the massive rejection of any course of action 
whatsoever (including the null option of taking no action) indicates that it 
would be a category mistake to accord standing to potential but now never 
to be conceived future persons in an analysis of the consequences of a 
policy that necessarily precludes their existence.  The hypothetical 
preferences of those future persons who have the potential to exist under 
one policy alternative or another, but whose existence would be precluded 
by the specific policy measure under consideration, should be ignored in 
assessing that policy‘s effects.62 
                                                 
 61.  This is under the assumption that offer prices, a more conservative and constrained 
measure of willingness to pay, are utilized as the approach for measuring willingness to pay.  
These aggregate costs would likely be infinite if asking price measures rather than offer 
price measures were utilized. 
 62.  Jeffrey Gaba has insightfully likened this situation to the science fiction motif of 
an infinite number of universes being generated each instant as our present decisions create 
multiple alternative futures.  Farber & Gaba, supra note 26, at 257 n.24.  He also draws the 
analogy to multi-universe interpretations of the probabilistic results of quantum physics.  Id.  
He concludes as do I that the adverse impacts of our policies upon this multitude of potential 
but now never to be conceived persons should be ignored, though not for the reason that I 
give that their inclusion in the analysis would lead to absurd results, but instead because their 
competing interests should be regarded as "cancelling out;" cost-benefit analysis should in 
effect be "renormalized" to eliminate such infinite values in a manner that parallels what 
physicists do in their quantum mechanics equations.  Id.  Steven Landsburg, in his 
entertaining book MORE SEX IS SAFER SEX, also addresses to a modest extent the question of 
how to value the consequences of our actions for yet-unconceived future persons.  STEVEN E. 
LANDSBURG, MORE SEX IS SAFER SEX 238–43 (2007).  Landsburg recognizes that our policy 
choices raise moral questions with regard to their impacts upon yet-unconceived future 
generations and that these questions are of practical significance for real-world 
policymaking.  See id. at 238, 243 ("Do we have any moral obligation to account for the 
interests of trillions of potential people, who will never have the opportunity to live unless 
we conceive them?").  He also recognizes the perhaps insurmountable difficulty of these 
questions.  Id. at 239 ("Perhaps [we should just admit] . . . that we‘re incapable of being 
logically rigorous about issues involving the unconceived.").  His analysis, however, appears 
to regard unconceived future persons as comprising a single large group who can either be 
conceived or not, depending on what course of action we pursue, rather than recognizing that 
they actually constitute a vast multiplicity of alternative groups of persons extending through 
time.  See id. at 238–39 (referring to future persons generally as the "unconceived").  A 
policy action leading the conception of one group would necessarily preclude the conception 
of all of the other groups, necessitating the development of a framework for addressing these 
stark intra-group conflicts of interest were any rights for unconceived persons to be 
recognized.  Landsburg does not address this difficulty, and consequently does not appear to 
understand the full significance of endogeniety of identity consequences for policy analysis.  
See id. at 238 (examining the issue of endogeneity in a perhaps more simplistic fashion:  "Do 
we have any moral obligation to account for the interests of trillions of potential people, who 
will never have the opportunity to live unless we conceive them?"). 
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 But what about the first group of future persons who will be conceived 
and born post-policy with genetic endowments that are influenced by the 
policy‘s spreading effects, for whom the policy‘s implementation is a 
necessary condition of their existence?  One would expect that at least the 
overwhelming majority, if not all, of these future persons who would owe 
their very existence to the implementation of a policy would, if given the 
opportunity, assign very high offer prices
63
 to the policy even were that 
policy to have some adverse or even catastrophic consequences for their 
well-being.  But these genetic identity-altering consequences of a policy 
will persist and magnify for all eternity, and it is of course not knowable in 
advance how many future persons from each era would exist to declare 
their valuations in such a hypothetical referendum, let alone what the 
wealth endowment and precise preference structure of each of these future 
persons would be that would constrain the magnitude of their offer prices.  
While it  will therefore not be possible to precisely calculate these benefits 
nor ascertain the distribution of the costs and benefits of a policy between 
existing persons and future persons, it is clear that any policy whatsoever, 
no matter how broadly catastrophic its long-term impacts, would result in 
truly massive benefits for those future persons
64
 who otherwise would not 
have been born, benefits that would, even if heavily time-discounted, 
completely dominate the magnitude of any adverse impacts upon existing 
persons
65 
for the obvious reason that all of the untold trillions of future 
persons whose hypothetical preferences are being considered would owe 
their very existence to the implementation of that policy.   
 So the result is that a cost-benefit analysis of any policy measure 
whatsoever that takes into account the endogeniety of identity, regardless of 
the nature of the policy‘s impacts upon existing persons, will result in 
massive benefits of highly uncertain magnitude for the combined group of 
existing persons and future persons.  Of what use, if any, would such an 
analysis be for policymakers in choosing among alternatives?  
 Consider, for example, a radically present-oriented proposal to put all 
of our high-level radioactive wastes into ordinary steel barrels that will not 
provide effective long-term containment beyond a century or two and then 
dump them all overboard into the Pacific Ocean.
66
  This policy would free 
                                                 
 63.  And likely infinite asking prices if asking prices are the willingness to pay-based 
measure utilized for the valuations. 
 64. This is true even if one uses more restrictive offer price measures that are limited 
by people‘s wealth endowments, rather than potentially unlimited asking price measures of 
these benefits. 
 65. I am assuming that future persons are psychologically similar to existing persons 
in that they would essentially unanimously prefer life under even quite difficult 
circumstances over non-existence. 
 66. This particular hypothetical is analyzed in some detail in my earlier articles on the 
subject.  See Crespi, Fatal Flaw, supra note 4, at 10710–11 ("For those untold trillions of 
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billions of dollars of resources now devoted each year to radioactive waste 
storage efforts to be diverted to other pressing social needs.
67
  While those 
future persons born several centuries from now and thereafter may well 
suffer very significant adverse environmental consequences from such an 
action, the multi-billion dollar current resource reallocations that such a 
policy would allow would have cascading genetic identity-altering 
consequences that would surely be universal in scope well before those 
barrels began to leak their poisons. 
 As previously discussed, those potential but now never to be 
conceived future persons who as a result of those resource reallocations will 
not be born should not be accorded standing in a cost-benefit analysis of the 
ocean waste dumping policy.
68
  The future persons that will be born as a 
genetic identity-altering consequence of that ocean waste dumping policy 
would owe their very existence to it.  If they could be asked for their 
opinions about the policy, if they are at all like existing persons in their 
psychological make-up they would surely overwhelmingly (if not 
unanimously) prefer coming into existence, even if their lives involved 
grappling with a serious radioactive waste problem, to nonexistence.  They 
would of course much prefer existence without the radioactive waste 
problem, were that an option that could be chosen, but the central insight 
that comes from recognizing the endogeniety of identity is that this is not 
possible.  The only choice that those future persons should be 
hypothetically presented with for cost-benefit valuation purposes is the 
bundled Hobson‘s Choice of life with the radioactive waste problem or 
nonexistence, and if they are at all like existing persons given this choice 
they would assign very large benefits to the policy, however those benefits 
are assessed.  
 The ocean waste dumping policy will therefore be very favorably 
judged by a cost-benefit analysis that incorporates the endogeneity of 
identity, since at least most of the existing persons who will surely be dead 
long before the wastes leak into the environment and cause adverse 
biological consequences would be on balance be net beneficiaries of the 
large resource reallocations thereby made possible by the policy,
69
 and the 
                                                                                                                 
future persons whose identity will be affected by those consequences of a policy, the policy 
is a necessary condition of their existence.  Its impacts will thus be valued very highly by 
those persons as against their actual alternative of non-existence."); Crespi, What’s Wrong, 
supra note 4, at 10873, 10881 ("These future persons that will be born as a consequence of 
that ocean dumping policy would owe their very existence to it."). 
 67.  See Crespi, What’s Wrong, supra note 4, at 108703 (noting who dumping nuclear 
waste into the Pacific Ocean in reinforced steel barrels would save billions of dollars). 
 68.  Supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 69. I concede that there may well be existing persons who empathize sufficiently with 
the environmental problems that the ocean waste dumping policy may cause for the 
members of distant future generations that they would regard the policy as imposing net 
costs on themselves, despite the more immediate and tangible benefits that may accrue to 
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long parade of generations of future persons for whom the policy is a 
necessary condition of their existence could be plausibly assumed to chime 
in with declarations of truly massive benefits, although of very uncertain 
magnitude in the aggregate.  As I have already made clear, however, any 
other policy proposal would also receive a ringing endorsement, even those 
policies that are broadly disfavored by existing persons, since the cost-
benefit calculations would invariably be dominated by the benefits resulting 
for the vast horde of members of distant future generations for whom the 
particular policy at issue would be a necessary condition of their existence.   
 As another example particularly relevant to the subject of this article, 
consider any of a number of possible policies that would each impose in 
some significant fashion limitations on fossil fuel use in order to reduce 
carbon emissions, in an attempt to reduce long-term global warming.  The 
substantial current costs imposed by any of those policies would obviously 
have significant and quickly universal consequences for the genetic 
identities of future individuals.
70
  Each possible policy that might be 
pursued would be a necessary condition of the existence of the particular 
parade of the untold billions of future persons who would later conceived 
and born as a consequence of that policy.
71
  Those persons would doubtless 
each offer very large positive valuations of that policy, since their actual 
alternative for comparison would be non-existence.  These valuations in the 
aggregate, even if heavily time-discounted to a much smaller present value 
figure, would still certainly total gazillions of dollars and would completely 
dominate the current costs imposed by the policy regardless of their 
magnitude.  Such an indiscriminate and imprecise blanket endorsement of 
all policy options whatsoever, regardless of their current costs, obviously 
would not provide climate regulation policymakers with any useful 
guidance as to which of these various policies, if any, should be pursued.        
 The valuation problem posed for cost-benefit analysis by the 
endogeniety of identity is thus squarely posed, and is revealed to perhaps be 
insurmountable.
72
  For any policy measure whatsoever, for those untold 
billions of future persons who will come into existence over time as a result 
of the implementation of that particular policy the policy is a necessary 
condition of their existence.  Its impacts will thus be valued very highly by 
those persons, as against their actual alternative of nonexistence.  The 
                                                                                                                 
them from the resource allocation savings.  However, I feel confident that on balance the net 
costs this policy would impose on these unusually empathetic persons will be substantially 
outweighed by the net benefits for the large number of existing persons whose empathetic 
time horizons do not span as far into the future as several centuries or more.  
 70.  Supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 71.  Supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 72.  See Crespi, Fatal Flaw, supra note 4, at 10712 ("[A]ttempting to value those 
person-altering consequences in the usual willingness-to-pay-based manner unfortunately 
leads to the cost-benefit analysis ‗blowing up.‘"). 
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conventional practice of valuing the consequences of a policy as compared 
to the hypothetical baseline scenario of a world in which those same 
persons would exist, but without experiencing the policy‘s impacts, makes 
no sense at all since such an alternative scenario under which those same 
persons would still exist could not possibly occur.  Willingness-to-pay-
based assessments of benefits for future persons that are derived in such a 
fashion are completely arbitrary and irrelevant.   
 Moreover, assessments so derived are not only arbitrary but are also 
likely to be biased downwards, in some instances dramatically so.  This is 
because for some policies (such as the ocean waste dumping hypothetical 
that I have discussed above) many future persons would presumably 
strongly prefer the unattainable scenario in which they are presumed to still 
exist, but without experiencing the adverse impacts of the policy at issue, as 
compared to the world that would actually result for them from the policy‘s 
consequences.
73
  Under that particular hypothetical comparison those future 
persons would then likely assign costs rather than very large benefits to the 
policy‘s consequences, leading in the aggregate to a massive undervaluation 
of the future effects of the policy as compared to its valuation if those future 
persons were to assess it as against their actual alternative of nonexistence.   
 So the endogeniety of identity can no longer be credibly ignored in 
policy assessment.  But as noted the other horn of the dilemma is that cost-
benefit analyses that incorporate the endogeniety of identity, but still 
attempt to value future consequences in the usual willingness to pay-based 
manner, will generate unhelpful results since all policy options will now 
result in truly massive future benefits
74
 that even if very heavily time-
discounted will still completely dominate any adverse effects of any of the 
policies upon existing persons.
75
  A valuation methodology that essentially 
ignores adverse policy impacts on existing persons, no matter how 
substantial they may be, is rather ridiculous.  Moreover, those future 
benefits are simply not measurable with sufficient precision to allow the 
alternative policy options to be meaningfully compared and ranked.  
 My criticisms of cost-benefit analysis may appear somewhat harsh, but 
I do not intend to suggest that cost-benefit analysts have been acting in 
conscious bad faith when they have used inappropriate and irrelevant 
baseline scenarios as the standard of comparison in their analyses.  I believe 
                                                 
 73.  Supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 74. This is true even if more constrained offer prices measures of willingness to pay 
are utilized.  Policies will clearly all result in infinite net benefits if asking price measures of 
willingness to pay are utilized, given the endogeniety of identity. 
 75.  See Crespi, Fatal Flaw, supra note 4, at 10712 ("This endogeneity problem may 
well be fatal to cost-benefit analysis . . . because of the pervasiveness and significance of 
person-altering consequences meaningful policy recommendations cannot be formulated 
solely on the basis of conventional secular and consequentialist ethical premises and their 
willingness-to-pay-based valuation corollary . . . ."). 
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that their failure take into account the endogeniety of identity in their 
analyses has been due primarily to their overlooking that fact, rather than 
due to their deliberately and covertly choosing to ignore it in light of its 
adverse consequences for the relevance of their methodology.  There is 
apparently a general lack of familiarity among cost-benefit analysts with the 
work of Derek Parfit and other philosophers who have wrestled with the 
implications of the endogeniety of identity.  Nevertheless, it is high time 
that it become more widely recognized that the endogeniety of identity 
renders completely inapposite the use of cost-benefit analysis in any context 
where one wants to take into account the impacts of policies on future 
persons as well as on existing persons, which is of course very much the 
case in evaluating climate regulation policies. 
 
III. Some Recent Discussions of the Application of Cost-Benefit Analysis to 
Climate Regulation 
 
 The essential defining feature of cost-benefit analysis is its use of a 
willingness to pay metric for valuing the costs and benefits of the policy 
under consideration.
76
  Recent scholarship that attempts to assess and 
improve upon the application of cost-benefit analysis to the difficult 
questions posed by climate regulation policies unfortunately consistently 
overlooks the severe problem posed by the endogeniety of identity for 
efforts to apply the willingness to pay valuation metric to evaluate the long-
term future consequences of such policies.
77
  That work generally fails to 
point out the inadequacy of cost-benefit analyses that try to avoid this 
problem by explicitly or implicitly assuming that genetic identity is 
exogenous with regard to the policies under consideration.
78
     
 I will discuss below three recent examples of this work that all 
evidence this major shortcoming.  First, I will consider two SSRN working 
papers, one by Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner of the University of 
Chicago that is titled Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis,
79
 and the other by Richard Revesz and Matthew Shahabian of the 
NYU Law School and that is titled "Climate Change and Future 
Generations."
80
  I will also consider a recent report by Frank Ackerman and 
Elizabeth Stanton of the Stockholm Environment Institute, titled "The 
                                                 
 76.  Supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 77.  See generally Masur & Posner, Climate Regulation, supra note 1 (discussing how 
cost-benefit analysis is particularly challenged by climate change regulation). 
 78.  See id. (ignoring the issue of endogeneity). 
 79.  Supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 80.  Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 2, at 3–4 (arguing that the risks of climate 
change, proper discount rates, and existing studies justify a higher social cost of carbon than 
the Obama Administration's estimate of $21 per ton).  
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A. The Masur and Posner Paper 
  
 This recent SSRN working paper by Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner
82
 
promises to be highly influential for several reasons.  First of all, it 
identifies and discusses a surprisingly large number of recent U.S. federal 
government regulatory initiatives that have been undertaken to address the 
global climate change implications of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gas emissions,
83
 and also discusses in some detail an important Office of 
Management and Budget-sponsored Interagency Working Group report 
regarding the social cost of carbon emissions
84
 that has influenced many of 
these regulatory initiatives, and this report and most of these regulatory 
initiatives have yet received little if any comment in the law review 
literature.
85
  Second, it provides a thoughtful and powerful critique that 
points out the inadequacies of the recent efforts of various government 
regulatory agencies to utilize the technique of cost-benefit analysis to 
establish the social cost of carbon emissions so as to provide a yardstick for 
assessing the benefits of various regulatory restraints on such emissions.
86
  
Finally, Eric Posner is a widely read and highly respected scholar in this 
area, and his pronouncements will certainly be influential in shaping the 
subsequent academic and regulatory discourse.
87
 
                                                 
 81.  ACKERMAN & STANTON, supra note 1, at 1 (evaluating justifications for 
intergenerational discounting, finding that such discounting diverges from financial market 
analysis, and recognizing the importance of moral theory in climate change decisions). 
 82.  See Masur & Posner, supra note 1 (discussing climate change in an article 
available on the Social Science Research Network ("SSRN")). 
 83. See id. at 2 (introducing some recent actions taken by the U.S. federal government 
regarding climate change policy).  
 84. See id. at 4, 12–15 (analyzing recent studies concerning the social cost of carbon 
emissions and climate change). 
 85. See id. at 2 (describing various regulatory activities of the U.S. federal government 
regarding climate change and the scholarly reaction to those activities).  
 86. See id. at 17–32 (criticizing recent governmental efforts to use cost-benefit 
analysis in regulating carbon emissions). 
 87. See e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS 1–9 (2006) (describing cost-benefit analysis); Matthew D. Adler & Eric 
A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences are Distorted, 29 J. LEG. 
STUD. 1105, 1105–08 (2000) (criticizing some cost-benefit analysis methodologies); 
Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L. J. 165, 
167–69 (1999) (arguing for a new approach to the use of cost-benefit analysis); Jonathan A. 
Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 657–62 
(2010) (criticizing feasibility analysis); Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1137–42 (2001) (discussing the use of cost-
benefit analysis in policy-making); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 537–43 (2005) (analyzing the downsides of cost-benefit analysis).  
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 Masur and Posner's overall assessment of U.S. government efforts to 
utilize cost-benefit analysis to guide climate regulation initiatives is 
knowledgeable and sympathetic, but is on balance relatively critical.
88
  
They are generally supportive in principle of the use of cost-benefit 
methodology for routine administrative policy evaluation, although they are 
well aware of and responsive to many of the various criticisms that have 
been directed at that approach.
89
  They conclude, however, that U.S. 
regulatory agencies have been evasive in their analyses of climate 
regulation policies in that they have generally offered only a very broad 
range of estimates for the social costs of carbon emissions, rather than 
advancing a more useful and definitive point estimate, and moreover have 
then subsequently largely disregarded their own calculations when 
assessing their regulatory initiatives.
90
  They also conclude that those 
agencies have failed to address a number of serious political issues that 
arise in such cost-benefit analyses with regard to valuing the impacts of 
climate regulations due to the global nature of climate change,
91
 and that 
further Congressional or Presidential Executive Order action is necessary to 
resolve these political questions and allow the agencies to focus their efforts 
on addressing the difficult technical problems that are involved in 
accurately establishing the social cost of carbon emissions.
92
 
 Masur and Posner‘s paper provides a very useful late-2010 snapshot of 
U.S. regulatory efforts to address the problem of carbon dioxide emissions 
and their climate change implications, and their critique of the ways in 
which cost-benefit analyses have been conducted and their results applied 
in this area is insightful.
93
  Unfortunately, however, their critique overlooks 
the key point that all of the cost-benefit analyses that they refer to ignore 
the fact of the endogeniety of genetic identity relative to the policies being 
assessed, and that those analyses consequently reach results that are, as I 
have discussed in Part II above, irrelevant to the real choices at hand.
94
  By 
not calling attention to this severe deficiency, Masur and Posner also 
implicitly accept without defending the legitimacy of the conventional cost-
                                                 
 88.  See Masur & Posner, supra note 1, at 17 (describing the U.S. government‘s 
climate change policies). 
 89. See id. at 17, 32–34 (analyzing the pros and cons of cost-benefit analysis in 
government policy-making). 
 90. See id. at 4, 15–16, 35 (discussing the U.S. government‘s analysis of the social 
costs of carbon emissions and the regulation thereof). 
 91. See id. at 25–35 (describing the political issues surrounding climate change 
policy). 
 92. See id. at 25–35 (criticizing the U.S. government‘s response to global climate 
change and recommending a course of action for the U.S. government). 
 93.  See id. at 6–16 (describing the U.S. federal government‘s recent regulations of 
carbon emissions). 
 94.  See id. at 32–34 (criticizing the cost-benefit analysis methodology currently being 
employed in climate change policy). 
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benefit valuation framework that rests upon comparing policy consequences 
with a demonstrably unattainable and thus completely arbitrary and 
irrelevant baseline scenario.
95
  All of their recommendations are directed 
towards improving the accuracy of the cost-benefit valuations that are 
calculated with regard to this baseline, and then making better and more 
politically defensible use of these more accurate valuations.
96
   
 But as I have discussed above, the immense measurement error that is 
introduced by an analyst initially making entirely wrong comparisons—by 
their contrasting the consequences of a policy for future persons to an 
arbitrary and unattainable baseline scenario that also assumes the existence 
of those persons without the policy, rather than the actual alternative of 
those future persons‘ non-existence if that policy is not pursued, given the 
endogeniety of identity—is so large that it renders trivial any gains in 
accuracy that might be obtained by making more technically accurate and 
politically defensible valuations of these comparisons such as Masur and 
Posner recommend.
97
  The cost-benefit studies that Masur and Posner 
critique and seek to improve are all fundamentally flawed by their incorrect 
initial assumptions as to the relevant comparisons, and this is a difficulty 
that cannot be adequately addressed simply by obtaining more accurate 
measurements of those inapt comparisons.
98
  This conventional cost-benefit 
methodology that is utilized by regulatory agencies would continue to be 
fatally flawed even if the substantial technical and political difficulties that 
are presented by the application of this methodology to climate regulation, 
and that are well described by Masur and Posner, were to be somehow 
overcome.
99
   
 Masur and Posner‘s efforts would have been more helpful for 
formulating sound climate regulation policies if had they first attempted to 
put forward and justify modifications of the conventional cost-benefit 
analytical framework sufficient to properly reflect the endogeniety of 
identity, before then addressing the somewhat less difficult, although still 
formidable, technical and political issues inherent in attempts to measure 
the social cost of carbon once the proper framework of comparison has 
been delineated.  Alternatively, and more radically, they might have 
advanced an entirely different normative framework for evaluating 
proposed climate regulations that does not focus, as does cost-benefit 
analysis, upon those regulations‘ impacts upon specific future persons and 
thereby unavoidably raise these endogeniety of identity difficulties.  I 
                                                 
 95.  See id. at 6–34 (analyzing the drawbacks of cost-benefit analysis in social policy). 
 96.  See id. at 4–6 (outlining the objectives of Masur and Posner‘s paper). 
 97.  See id. at 32–35 (recommending  the U.S. government take a more accurate and 
politically defensible cost-benefit analysis approach to climate change). 
 98.  See id. at 32–34 (criticizing cost-benefit analysis methodologies). 
 99.  See id. at 17–34 (discussing the numerous technical and political difficulties 
underlying regulatory agencies' cost-benefit analyses of climate change). 
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unfortunately do not have such a non-consequentialist evaluative 
framework ready at hand to offer, and moreover I am rather skeptical 
whether one can ever be developed that would obtain widespread support 
across groups of persons with diverse philosophical and theological beliefs.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that using conventional cost-benefit methodology, 
with its implicit assumption that policies do not affect genetic identity, to 
guide climate regulation policy, is simply not credible in light of the 
demonstrable endogeniety of identity even were the severe measurement 
and political difficulties presented by its application and well-described by 
Masur and Posner to be adequately addressed.
100
                     
  
B.  The Revesz and Shahabian Paper 
 
 This second SSRN working paper by Richard Revesz and Matthew 
Shahabian also promises to significantly influence the climate regulation 
policy debate.
101
  First of all, it provides a thoughtful and comprehensive 
discussion of the analytical complexity and moral aspects involved in 
discounting policy benefits to future generations relative to current costs 
and benefits.
102
  The use of such intergenerational discounting is obviously 
a critical aspect of any cost-benefit analysis that purports to compare the 
long-term benefits for future persons of a climate regulation policy with its 
current costs and benefits.  Second, Richard Revesz is one of the world‘s 
leading scholars with regard to the philosophical and practical questions 
presented by attempts to discount future policy consequences, and his 
thoughts on these questions as they arise in the climate regulation context 




 Revesz and Shahabian argue that all of the current justifications 
offered for discounting the costs and benefits of policies for future persons, 
before those costs and benefits are then compared to the policies‘ current 
costs and benefits, are fundamentally flawed in that they inadequately 
reflect the nature and complexity of our moral obligations to future 
                                                 
 100.  See id. at 17–34 (describing the technical and political difficulties of using cost-
benefit analysis to develop climate change regulatory policy). 
 101.  See Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 2, at 1 (discussing the significance of the 
author's work). 
 102.  See id. (outlining Revesz and Shahabian‘s technical and moral criticisms of 
discounting techniques). 
 103.  See, e.g., RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY:  
HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 
10–20 (2008) (discussing how cost-benefit analysis has become increasingly used by the 
U.S. federal government); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 941–1017 (1999) 
(criticizing the use of cost-benefit analysis in environmental regulation). 




  In their paper, they classify the justifications commonly 
offered for discounting future costs and benefits at a specific discount rate 
into one of four categories.
105
  The first category of justifications for such 
discounting they label "prescriptive pure time preference discounting" 
justifications, and these justifications are based upon the embrace of one or 
another underlying ethical norm regarding the weight that current 
generations should accord to the interests of future generations.
106
  The 
second category they label "descriptive pure time preference discounting" 
justifications, and these justifications are based upon empirical evidence 
regarding the choices that people actually make between consumption and 
savings for the future.
107
   Their third category, which they call ―opportunity 
cost discounting‖ justifications, are justifications based upon consideration 
of the opportunity costs involved in pursuing a particular policy.
108
  Finally, 
what they label as ―growth discounting‖ justifications are those 
justifications based upon the observation that since future generations are 
very likely to be wealthier than current generations, even if those future 
generations should be treated equally with current generations from an 
ethical standpoint, discounting future benefits may still be justified on the 
basis of the diminishing marginal utility of wealth.
109
  
 Revesz and Shahabian consider and reject each of those justifications 
for discounting future benefits as providing inadequate support for the use 
of a specific discount rate in the context of the long-term effects of climate 
regulation policies.
110
  Their analysis is extensive and merits a close 
                                                 
 104.  See Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 2, at 1 (introducing a moral critique of the 
discounting methods currently employed by climate change policy-makers).  
 105.  See id. at 4, 5–7 (outlining and comparing the alleged justifications for using 
discounting methodology in climate change policy). 
 106.  See id. at 9–12 (describing the first of three categories of justifications for using 
discounting methodology in climate change policy). 
 107.  See id. at 12–14 (describing the second of three categories of justifications for 
using discounting methodology in climate change policy). 
 108.  See id. at 15–16 (defining "opportunity costs" as the foregone benefits of a future 
generation that will result from attempts to benefit that future generation through climate 
change mitigation). 
 109.  See id. at 14–15 (using a formula for the rising discount rate which equals the rate 
at which per capita consumption grows multiplied by the elasticity of marginal utility gained 
from an extra unit of consumption, which is a measure of society‘s "aversion to income 
inequality"). 
 110.  See generally id. (summarizing each consideration and rejection of the various 
justifications); infra notes 112–115 and accompanying text (same).  They also briefly 
discuss in their paper the concept of "hyperbolic" discounting, which is a method of 
discounting whereby future benefits are discounted by a discount rate that gradually declines 
over time, rather than by a conventional single discount rate that remains constant over time.  
Id. at 17–22.  However, they do not regard this form of discounting as resting upon 
justifications that are independent of the four categories of justifications that they do discuss, 
but only as a particular application of discounting that would also have to be defended by 
one or another of those four possible categories of justifications.  Id. at 22. 
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reading, and I will not attempt to summarize their reasoning in this short 
article.  Their overall conclusions, however, can be succinctly stated.  They 
conclude that discounting benefits to future generations at any particular 
discount rate merely because those persons will live in the future rather than 
in the present is ethically indefensible,
111
 that the descriptive pure time 
preference justification for discounting future benefits inappropriately 
conflates intrapersonal savings choices with intergenerational decisions,
112
 
that the opportunity cost discounting justification for discounting future 
benefits ignores potential irreversibilities of climate change and the rising 
costs of mitigation measures,
113
 and that the growth discounting 
justification inappropriately conflates environmental goods with 
consumption goods.
114
  Their overarching conclusion is that the choice of a 
discount rate for a cost-benefit analysis that is based on one or more of 
these justifications "cannot substitute for a moral theory setting forth our 
obligations to future generations."
115
  This discount rate choice is, in their 
view, not just a technical matter, but is a broader decision that has 
fundamental, philosophical, and moral ramifications.
116
  
 The Revesz and Shabian paper presents a sophisticated analysis and 
forceful critique of the various justifications that are usually offered (or just 
implicitly assumed) for the choice of a particular discount rate when a cost-
benefit analyst attempts to compare the costs and benefits of a policy for 
future generations with its current costs and benefits.
117
  However, the 
relevance of their discount rate analysis to the issues presented by climate 
regulation policy is unfortunately badly undercut by the fact that their 
analysis is limited to considering the appropriate discount rates to apply to 
discount the future benefits of a policy when those benefits are calculated 
with regard to the conventional baseline scenario that assumes the 
exogeniety of identity; that assumes that if the policy were not pursued then 
                                                 
 111.  See id. at 79 (arguing that "prescriptive pure time preference discounting is 
inconsistent with moral intuitions and has little support even among economists"). 
 112.  See id. at 80 ("The savings rate is not useful as revealed preferences for how 
society sees its obligations to the future—both because the savings rate does not capture all 
intergenerational transfers and because of its wide disparity with stated preferences of our 
obligations to future generations."). 
 113.  See id. at 80–81 (explaining that certain investments may reduce mitigation costs; 
however, "that may be more than offset if future generations are stuck with irreversible, 
catastrophic damage, or are even forced simply to spend significantly more on climate 
change mitigation in the future because current generations decided not to").  
 114.  See id. at 81 (arguing that future generations are actually likely to value 
environmental improvements more than current generations, and the discount formula 
should be adjusted to reflect this). 
 115.  Id. at 1; see also id. at 82 (discussing the same point in further detail). 
 116.  Id. at 1. 
 117.  See generally supra notes 104–113 and accompanying text (summarizing their 
analysis and critique of these justifications). 
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those same future persons would still come into existence, but now not 
experience the impacts of the policy.
118
  They do not explicitly state and 
defend the reasonableness of this exogeniety of identity assumption, but 
their embrace of this assumption is implicit throughout their paper,
119
 and 
while their work is otherwise comprehensively documented, they make no 
attempt to rebut or even cite to the arguments offered by Derek Parfit and 
others as to the endogeniety of identity and its implications.
120
    
 As I have discussed above, however, cost-benefit analyses that attempt 
to value future benefits through making such an inapt comparison of a 
policy‘s projected consequences with the reference point of an irrelevant 
and demonstrably unattainable baseline scenario that wrongly presupposes 
that genetic identity is exogenous will result in arbitrary, misleading, and 
ultimately useless benefit measures.
121
  It is somewhat misguided to then 
expend substantial efforts to determine how to most appropriately discount 
such essentially meaningless future cost and benefit figures that have been 
calculated at the outset through such a flawed measurement approach.  The 
consequences of a policy for future persons should first of all be valued 
with regard to the actual alternative of those persons‘ non-existence, were 
that policy not to be pursued.  Only then can one meaningfully address the 
also important but distinctly secondary questions of why and how those 
future impacts should then be properly discounted, if at all, before their 
aggregation with the current impacts of the policy. 
                                                 
 118.   See PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS, supra note 22, at 351–79 (elaborating even 
further on previous discussions that emphasize taking into account whether or not persons in 
a future generation will exist because of the pursuit or non-pursuit of a particular policy 
when determining whether that policy is morally defensible); Kavka, supra note 22, at 95–
96 (echoing Parfit‘s thesis concerning the flaw in assuming endogeneity of identity, but also 
not labeling it as such); Parfit, Future Generations, supra note 22, at 171–72 (continuing his 
earlier analysis and that of Kavka and ultimately concluding that a person-affecting principle 
should not be used when determining the rightness or wrongness of a particular policy‘s 
impact on a future generation); Parfit, On Doing the Best, supra note 22, at 100–09 
(discussing the problems associated with assuming endogeneity of identity, but using a 
different label for the term); see also discussion supra Part II (summarizing the concept of 
endogeneity and why it should be assumed as the baseline scenario rather than exogeneity of 
identity). 
 119.  See generally Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 2 (defending their critique of the 
various justifications for discounting the rate at which the future benefits of a particular 
climate change policy is converted to present value without accounting for persons who exist 
solely as a result of not pursuing that particular policy).  
 120.  See, e.g., PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS, supra note 22 at 351-81 (articulating and 
defending the concept of endogeneity of identity, but using a different label for the term); 
supra note 118 (same); but cf. Revesz & Shahabian supra note 2, at 41 n.148 (referring to 
Derek Parfit‘s 1984 book REASONS AND PERSONS, but citing that work for other reasons, and 
not for Parfit‘s discussion of the endogeniety of identity and its various ethical and analytical 
implications). 
 121.  See discussion supra pp. 238–239 and accompanying notes (discussing this point 
in greater detail). 
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 It would have been more helpful for formulating sound climate 
regulation policies had Revesz and Shahabian focused their analysis of 
discounting justifications
122
 upon the discounting of the estimates of future 
costs and benefits that would be obtained under the far more realistic 
assumption that those future persons impacted by a policy would never 
have been conceived and born had the particular policy under consideration 
not been implemented.  Those aggregate benefits to those untold billions (or 
even trillions) of future persons for whom the particular policy in question 
is a necessary condition of their existence are obviously going to be truly 
massive if measured by the usual cost-benefit analysis willingness to pay 
metric (as will also be the benefits of pursuing the null option of taking no 
action), and those benefits will consequently completely dominate the 
current costs of that policy, even if those costs are quite large, unless very 
high discount rates—such as, for example, triple-digit annual rates (!)—are 
applied to those future benefits.  The pressing cost-benefit analysis discount 
rate question that therefore needs to be answered is whether one can justify 
the use of such extremely high discount rates that would to reduce these 
truly massive future benefits, when discounted, to a size roughly 
commensurate with the current costs of various policies, so that the results 
of cost-benefit analyses might then possibly provide some meaningful 
discrimination among policy alternatives and as compared to the null option 
of inaction.  The implicit focus of Revesz and Shahabian‘s work, however, 
is a much different and practically somewhat irrelevant question.
123
  Their 
focus is on which, if any, of the various and far smaller single-digit annual 
discount rates that are now commonly used in conventional cost-benefit 
analyses can be somehow justified with regard to the long-term future 
consequences of climate regulation policies,
124
 or whether instead the use of 
a zero or near-zero discount rate is called for, when those future 
consequences that are to be discounted have been measured against a 
baseline scenario that assumes the exogeniety of identity.
125
  They are 
                                                 
 122.  See generally Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 2 (examining discounting for time 
preference on the basis of ethical norms, discounting for time preference because that is how 
people treat the future, discounting because future generations will be richer, and 
discounting because of opportunity costs); see also supra text accompanying notes 104–116 
(summarizing their conclusions concerning the justifications for the various discount rates). 
 123.  See supra text accompanying notes 118–121 (explaining the question on which 
Revesz and Shahabian focus in their article); see also Crespi supra note 11, at 94 
(concluding that since the future impact of policies will significantly alter the genetic 
identities of members of future generations, discounting issues will only have minor 
importance on valuations in the cost-benefit analysis and are therefore irrelevant).  
 124.  See supra notes 105–114 and accompanying text (summarizing Revesz and 
Shahabian‘s analysis of the justifications for these discount rates). 
 125.  See supra notes 118–121 and accompanying text (elaborating on the concept of 
exogeneity of identity and discussing why using it as a baseline scenario for evaluating 
justifications for discount rates is a flawed approach to the overall inquiry). 
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particularly interested in focusing attention on two recent and influential 
studies of climate change policy, THE STERN REVIEW:  REPORT ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE,
126
 by Sir Nicholas Stern, and William 
Nordhaus‘s A QUESTION OF BALANCE,127 that utilized very different single-
digit annual discount rates,
128
 and consequently reached very different 
recommendations as to what climate regulation measures would be cost-
justified.
129
  But the Stern and Nordhaus studies both incorrectly valued the 
benefits of climate regulation measures under the implicit assumption of the 
exogeniety of identity,
130
 so the question of whether either of these studies 
then used an appropriate discount rate to adjust those radically incorrect 
future cost and benefit valuations is not of great interest.
131
   
 While some of Revesz and Shahabain‘s analysis of the various 
justifications offered for discounting future policy consequences
132
 may 
well be relevant in some regards for answering the real question as to 
whether very high discount rates can ever be justified to apply to the future 
benefits of policies that are estimated under more realistic endogeniety of 
identity assumptions,
133
 they unfortunately do not attempt to apply their 
analysis in the context of those more realistic assumptions, so it is unclear 
exactly what weight they would give to these various technical and moral 
concerns that they raise in the very different context of an assumed 
exogeniety of identity.
134
       
 
 
                                                 
 126.  See generally Sir Nicholas Stern, THE STERN REVIEW:  THE ECONOMICS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE  (2007) (discussing the effect of global warming on the world economy). 
 127.  See generally William Nordhaus, A QUESTION OF BALANCE:  WEIGHING THE 
OPTIONS ON GLOBAL WARMING POLICIES (2008) (analyzing the economic and ecological 
dynamics of greenhouse gas emissions and mitigation efforts). 
 128.  See Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 3, at 7 (observing that Stern advocates a low 
discount rate and Nordhaus advocates a high discount rate).  
 129.  See id. (observing that Stern advocates aggressive steps to stop climate change and 
Norhaus advocates "a more measured response" to climate change).  
 130.  See Nordhaus, supra note 72, at 165–91 (discussing his approach to discounting 
benefits in assessing climate change policies without considering the identity of persons who 
exist solely because a particular policy was or was not pursued); Stern, supra note 71, at 35–
37 (same). 
 131.  See Crespi, supra note 1, at 94 (discussing that an analysis that assumes the 
exogeneity of identity makes inquiries into various discount rates irrelevant); supra note 66 
and accompanying text (overviewing Crespi‘s ocean dumping hypothetical). 
 132.  See supra notes 105–114 and accompanying text (summarizing Revesz and 
Shahabian‘s analysis on the various justifications for discounting future policy 
consequences). 
 133.  See supra Part II (providing a more detailed analysis of why assuming endogeneity 
of identity is a more realistic assumption).  
 134.  See supra text accompanying note 118 (defining the concept of exogeneity of 
identity). 
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C.  The Ackerman and Stanton Report 
  
 The third illustrative example of recent climate regulation scholarship 
that I would like to discuss and criticize is a short report titled ―The Social 
Cost of Carbon‖ that was prepared by Frank Ackerman and Elizabeth 
Stanton for the Economics for Equity and the Environmental Network.
135
  
This report should also be influential in policy circles because Frank 
Ackerman, for a number of years, has been one of the leading critics of the 
use of cost-benefit analysis to shape environmental policy.
136
  
 This report is in general accord with the two SSRN papers that I have 
previously discussed in that it does not sweepingly reject the use of cost-
benefit analysis altogether in this context, a position that is somewhat 
surprising given Ackerman‘s prior trenchant critiques of its application to 
environmental issues.
137
  However, it is highly critical of the specific 
valuation and discount rate assumptions that have been utilized in recent 
governmental efforts to establish a social cost of carbon for use in 
determining which climate regulation measures are cost-effective.
138
  It 
primarily focuses its critique, as does the Masur and Posner paper, upon the 
range of carbon cost estimates that were endorsed by the OMB-sponsored 
Interagency Working Group.
139
  The report discusses and critiques the 
several underlying climate models from which that Interagency Working 
Group derived both its initial and later revised carbon cost estimates.
140
  It 
also criticized the alternative 2.5%, 3% and 5% annual discount rates that 
                                                 
 135.  See generally ACKERMAN & STANTON, supra note 1 (discussing and critiquing 
government valuations of the social costs of carbon emissions in making climate regulation 
policies).    
 136.  See Frank Ackerman, et al., Applying Cost-Benefit to Past Decisions:  Was 
Environmental Protection Ever a Good Idea?, 57 ADMIN. LAW. REV. 155, 157 (2005) ("In 
practice, therefore, cost-benefit analysis is an opaque and technically intricate process 
accessible only to experts, and one that all too frequently recommends rejection of sensible 
policies, on the grounds that their costs exceed economists‘ estimates of their benefits."); 
Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless:  Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1553 (2002) (―Cost-benefit analysis 
differs, however, from other analytical approaches in the following respect:  it demands that 
the advantages and disadvantages of a regulatory policy be reduced, as far as possible, to 
numbers, and then further reduced to dollars and cents.  In this feature of cost-benefit 
analysis lies its doom.‖). 
 137.  See sources cited supra note 136 (illustrating the Ackerman and Stanton‘s 
previous criticisms of cost-benefit analyses). 
 138.  See ACKERMAN & STANTON, supra note 1, at 8–15 (observing that since serious 
anticipated damages from climate change cannot be quantified or monetized, estimates of 
the social cost of carbon "may be too low or logically incomplete"). 
 139.  See id. at 6–7 (describing the agencies participating in the Working Group and 
critiquing its estimates on the social costs of carbon). 
 140.  See id. at 8–11 (arguing that the choice of three specific integrated assessment 
models is arbitrary and biases the analysis). 
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were endorsed by that Interagency Working Group,
141
 echoing the point 
developed more fully by Revesz and Shahabian that the choice of a 
discount rate to use for discounting policy impacts upon future generations 
is an ethical judgment and not simply a technical matter of accurately 
measuring ―market‖ discount rates, however they are defined.142 
 The aspect of this report that I want to emphasize here is that 
Ackerman and Stanton, as do the Masur and Posner and Revesz and 
Shahabian papers, implicitly accept the legitimacy of valuing the impacts of 
climate regulation policies under the assumption of the exogeniety of 
identity.
143
  They do not question the meaningfulness of measuring the 
social costs of carbon emissions for the future persons affected by 
comparing the impacts of those emissions to the hypothetical baseline 
scenario of the circumstances that those exact same future persons would 
face were climate regulation measures now taken to preclude some of those 
carbon emissions.
144
  But once again, to admittedly belabor the simple point 
that I have made with regard to both the Masur and Posner and Revesz and 
Shahabian papers, given the endogeniety of identity this is a most inapt 
comparison of policy consequences with an arbitrary and demonstrably 
unattainable set of circumstances.  The willingness to pay-based valuations 
of the impacts of any policy upon the future persons who would experience 
those impacts should instead be calculated as against the actual alternative 
of those persons‘ non-existence were that policy not to be pursued.145  As I 
noted before when discussing the Revesz and Shahabian paper, it is 
premature and rather beside the point to call for incremental refinements in 
valuation methods and/or discount rate choices as long as cost-benefit 
analysts are not yet even making the proper comparisons.
146
       
           
IV.  Conclusion 
  
 The recent efforts by Masur and Posner, Revesz and Shahabian, and 
Ackerman and Stanton are each knowledgeable and sophisticated attempts 
to assess and improve the application of the cost-benefit methodology in the 
                                                 
 141.  See id. at 11–12 ("Casual estimates and unsupported judgments are used to justify 
discount rates that are inappropriately high for analysis that spans several generations."). 
 142.  See Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 2, at 1 (concluding that "discounting cannot 
substitute for a moral theory setting forth our obligations to future generations"). 
 143.  See supra notes 118–122 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of 
exogeneity of identity and how Revesz and Shahabian assume this concept as a baseline 
scenario for their analysis of justifications for discounts rates). 
 144.  See ACKERMAN & STANTON, supra note 1, at 1 (discussing their conclusion 
advocating a lower discount rate based on ethical grounds).  
 145.  See discussion supra Part II and note 5 (summarizing this concept in more detail 
and its background).  
 146.  See supra text accompanying note 105 (discussing the irrelevance of analyzing 
discount rates when assuming exogeneity of identity).  
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climate regulation context.  Unfortunately, however, these efforts each take 
for granted the appropriateness of conducting cost-benefit analyses that 
attempt to assess the impacts of policies upon future persons by comparing 
the circumstances that those policies are projected to create for those future 
persons with the circumstances that would be supposedly faced by those 
same future persons were the policy not to be implemented.  They each then 
suggest various refinements in the methods by which those impacts are 
quantified.
147
  However, once one recognizes the demonstrable fact that the 
fundamental genetic identity of future persons is an endogenous variable 
with regard to any policy under consideration, it is clear that the cost-
benefit methodology as conventionally applied with its implicit exogeniety 
of identity assumption is fundamentally flawed in a way cannot be 
remediated simply by more sophisticated valuation or discounting 
techniques.
148
   
 Cost-benefit analysts and the scholars that critique their work both 
need to recognize that the appropriate baseline comparison for valuing the 
impacts of any policy on future persons is what would be after a transitional 
period the actual situation if that policy is not implemented:  a radically 
different world in which none of those future persons would exist.  
Unfortunately, any attempt to value the impacts of a policy on future 
persons through the use of the willingness to pay metric when those impacts 
are a necessary condition of their existence, no matter how sophisticated the 
valuation methods and discounting procedures used, will result in truly 
massive and essentially meaningless positive valuations for any policy 
option whatsoever.   
 The cost-benefit methodology, premised as it is upon assessing the 
willingness to pay of the persons affected by a policy, is therefore a suitable 
approach only for valuing the impacts of a policy on those persons who are 
already in existence, at least in utero, before the policy is implemented.  If 
one for some reason wants to consider only the impacts of a policy on 
existing persons, and chooses to ignore the far larger endogeniety of 
identity consequences of the policy for all future generations, the guidance 
provided by such severely restricted cost-benefit analyses may be helpful, 
although it is unclear exactly what justification could be offered for taking 
such a circumscribed approach to assessing a particular policy.  However, 
climate regulation policies are obviously largely or even primarily focused 
upon the long-term impacts of various courses of action upon future 
                                                 
 147.  See discussion supra Part III.A (talking about this idea as it applies to the Masur 
and Posner paper); discussion supra Part III.B (discussing its application to the Revesz and 
Shahabian paper); discussion supra Part III.C (detailing its application to the Ackerman and 
Stanton paper). 
 148.  See supra text accompanying notes 105–115 (illustrating the irrelevance of 
analyzing discount rates when assuming exogeneity of identity). 
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persons not yet in existence when the policies are implemented.  A cost-
benefit analysis limited in scope to evaluating policy impacts upon existing 
persons would therefore rather obviously be an unsuitable approach in this 
context.  My overall conclusion is that cost-benefit analysis, understood as 
an attempt to assess policies solely with regard to their consequences for 
actual persons, and committed to valuing those consequences in accordance 
with the affected persons‘ willingness to pay to enjoy (or avoid) those 
consequences, has no helpful role to play in formulating climate regulation 
policy.          
                
  
 
